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Abstract
As a contribution to current debates on the ‘social life of methods’, in this article we
present an ethnomethodological study of the role of understanding within statistical
practice. After reviewing the empirical turn in the methods literature and the chal-
lenges to the qualitative-quantitative divide it has given rise to, we argue such case
studies are relevant because they enable us to see different ways in which ‘methods’,
here quantitative methods, come to have a social life – by embodying and exhibiting
understanding they ‘make the social structures of everyday activities observable’
(Garfinkel, 1967: 75), thereby putting society on display. Exhibited understandings
rest on distinctive lines of practical social and cultural inquiry – ethnographic ‘forays’
into the worlds of the producers and users of statistics – which are central to good
statistical work but are not themselves quantitative. In highlighting these non-statis-
tical forms of social and cultural inquiry at work in statistical practice, our case study
is an addition to understandings of statistics and usefully points to ways in which
studies of the social life of methods might be further developed from here.
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Introduction
Stemming from a growing interest in the ‘social life of method’ (Law
et al., 2011; Savage, 2013; and for a more general overview see Mair
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et al., 2013), studies of the emergence, contestation, stabilization, prolif-
eration and collapse of new methods and their diverse social, cultural and
political implications have been used to challenge a series of methodo-
logical orthodoxies allegedly definitive of the social sciences since the
mid-20th century (Savage and Burrows, 2007). The ‘qualitative-
quantitative divide’ has become a principal target (see Majima and
Moore, 2009; Adkins and Lury, 2012). Though it served as a significant
line of demarcation in the geography of the social sciences, the qualita-
tive-quantitative divide is now seen less as a technical distinction and
more as a moral and political one, exerting a pervasive and enduring
influence on the ‘imaginaries’ of the social sciences – something contem-
porary empirical work on method seeks to ‘unsettle’ and ‘disturb’
(Majima and Moore, 2009).
Those seeking to undermine a sharp distinction between the qualita-
tive and the quantitative are not alone in voicing disquiet, joining other
researchers arguing for a complete rethink of its putative bases. Current
discussions about ‘descriptive’, ‘inventive’ or ‘live’ methods in the social
sciences (e.g. Savage, 2009; Lury and Wakeford, 2012; Back and Puwar,
2012) were, in many respects, prefigured by advocates of ‘mixed methods’
from the 1980s onwards (e.g. Bryman, 1988; Tashakkori and Teddlie,
2010). Nonetheless, no matter how diversified the reasons for the cri-
tique, there are commonalities in the positions advanced. Those arguing
for a rethink hold: (a) that allowing researchers to identify themselves in
binary terms as either qualitative or quantitative, and specialize in one
‘kind’ of technique, is counter-productive, encouraging the subordination
of phenomena of interest to the methods used to study them, thereby
making the social sciences more rigid and dogmatic, less flexible and
responsive (see, e.g., Majima and Moore, 2009; Tashakkori and
Teddlie, 2010; Gane, 2012); (b) that describing researchers as qualitative
or quantitative does not describe their actual practices – research does
not neatly break into ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ work (see, e.g.,
Majima and Moore, 2009; Latour, 2010; Tashakkori and Teddlie,
2010; Gane, 2012); and (c) that describing researchers as qualitative or
quantitative does not describe the materials they work with – the quali-
tative-quantitative distinction does not carve ‘the empirical’ at the joints,
it does not neatly separate quantities and qualities, meaning that the
quantitative-qualitative divide is an artificial and unhelpful dichotomy
imposed upon the phenomena researchers are seeking to make sense of
(see, e.g., Kuhn, 1977; Latour, 2010; Gane, 2012). Gane usefully sum-
marizes the discontent: ‘a[ny] discipline dominated by stock quantitative
and qualitative methods is a discipline not only lacking in imagination,
but also one that in spite of its claims can never be empirical in any
meaningful sense’ (2012: 159).
Concerns about the bipolarization of research have acquired added
urgency in an age of digital data, digital ‘devices’ and digital methods in
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their many and varied forms (Elliot et al., 2013; Rogers, 2013; Ruppert
et al., 2013). In a research context characterized by rapid methodological
and technological change, a context where the computationally-oriented
are as likely to contribute to discussions on aesthetics (e.g. Tufte, 2006) as
literary and cultural theorists are to contribute to discussions on natural
language processing and data mining methodologies (Moretti, 2013;
Mohr and Ghaziani, 2014), the claim that this timeworn binary scheme
usefully partitions the universe of research is harder to sustain. Social,
cultural or political research is no longer meaningfully mapped along
clear-cut divisions, even rhetorically, with the era of big data analytics
opening the way to hybridized contributions from, and collaborations
with, art(i)s(ts) and humanities scholars, journalists, programmers, soft-
ware developers, mathematicians, computer scientists, data analysts, and
more (Savage, 2009; Savage and Burrows, 2007; Ruppert, 2013; Ruppert
and Savage, 2011). These newcomers have few qualms about employing
what would, until recently, have been regarded as unstable and meth-
odologically suspect mixtures of data and techniques in order to grapple
with the analytical problems at hand. The end-results of these activities
are as varied as the paths by which they are initiated: software applica-
tions, computer code, probabilistic (i.e. ‘statistical’) and non-
probabilistic (i.e. ‘algorithmic’, e.g., natural language processing and
machine-learning) models, digital visualizations, media, crowdsourcing
and citizen science platforms, searchable archives of audio, video and
textual materials, project wikis, digital user-interfaces, databases, news
stories, forecasts, even performances are as visible in contemporary
research as the book or journal article. However, even in digital research
there are fears that the qualitative-quantitative divide is being re-estab-
lished just as it was losing whatever residual significance it retained. As
boyd and Crawford recently put it, within big data analytics and digital
research more broadly,
there remains a mistaken belief that qualitative researchers are in
the business of interpreting stories and quantitative researchers are
in the business of producing facts. In this way, Big Data risks
re-inscribing established divisions in the long running debates
about scientific method and the legitimacy of social science and
humanistic inquiry. (2012: 667)
However, while many topics of interest are raised by current empirical
studies of method both digital and traditional, much of the recent debate
only makes sense against a background of understandings about what
research involves. It is assumed that ‘everyone knows’ what qualitative or
quantitative research consists in, an assumption that is traded upon but
not itself subject to investigation. Gane’s summary, much like that of
boyd and Crawford’s, is intelligible because it is assumed that those
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reading it will already know what is being talked about. If, however, as
critics argue, an essentialist division of research into quantitative and
qualitative strands makes little sense, a position we have sympathy
with, the question arises as to why those terms continue to be
employed and what alternatives might be found for characterizing
what researchers do.
After Garfinkel, we want to examine taken-for-granted assumptions
about quantitative research in particular, treating ‘as problematic . . . the
actual methods whereby members of a society, doing sociology, lay or
professional, make the social structures of everyday activities observable’
(Garfinkel, 1967: 75; emphasis added). The rest of our paper, therefore,
presents a case study of quantitative social scientists – statisticians – at
work. We argue, based on this case study, that labelling research prac-
tices as qualitative or quantitative (or indeed ‘mixed’) may well have
some uses (as badges of membership, for instance), but the labels them-
selves are not specifically descriptive of those practices and should not be
treated as such. Knowing whether a piece of research is qualitative or
quantitative, interpretive or calculative, we shall argue, is much less
important for characterizing that research than understanding the spe-
cific ways in which it makes ‘the social structures of everyday activities
observable’ – that is, how it puts society on display.
Using examples drawn from our fieldwork, we discuss two ways in
which the forms of understanding exhibited in and through statistical
practice put ‘the social structures of everyday activities’ on display.
Firstly, we argue that in their work, statisticians treat databases as
socio-cultural not just numerical artifacts. Indeed, statisticians both
investigate and reproduce the interweaving of cultural and technical
reasoning in the course of working on the numbers databases are com-
posed of. Drawing on Sacks’ notion of culture as an apparatus for both
doing and seeing the doing of things (Sacks, 1992: 226), we argue stat-
isticians must work ‘ethnographically’ as well as mathematically not
only to understand their data but also to be understood when they
employ that data in their analyses in turn. Secondly, we argue that
statisticians’ work exhibits an understanding of those they hope will
use the statistical tools they produce. Drawing on an example of a
model which failed on this count, we argue such displays of under-
standing are most powerful where they draw least attention because
they are built into the work itself. Insofar as statistical tools are rele-
vant to others, an acquired understanding of those others is thus on
display in the design of those tools. Where the first way of putting
society on display involves ethnographic ‘forays’, as one anonymous
reviewer felicitously put it, into the societies and cultures in which
the data being worked on has been produced, the second involves
ethnographic forays into the societies and cultures to which the prod-
ucts of their work are offered.
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Law, Ruppert and Savage (2011) argue that methods are ‘doubly’
social: ‘methods are social because they are constituted by the social
world of which they are a part’ but are also ‘social because they also
help to constitute that social world’ (2011: 1–2). Our case study provides
a different, less metaphysical, more concrete sense in which statistical
methods have a ‘double social life’, one which consists precisely in par-
ticular ways of exhibiting understandings of social and cultural practice
in terms of both their data and the statistical tools they develop, ways of
making social structures observable central to the intelligibility of their
work. Such exhibited understandings are grounded in determinate lines
of practical social and cultural inquiry integral to and undertaken as an
accountable, i.e. observable-reportable, part of good statistical work. By
attending to these forms of inquiry we gain insight into the ways in which
statistics connects with, and can be seen as relevantly speaking of and to,
the societies and cultures it analyses.
Quantification and Statistical Practice
Studies of statistical practice exemplify many of the issues we find in the
wider literature on methods. Probability, chance, statistics, quantification
and the mathematization of natural and social phenomena have been
recurrent topics within philosophy and the social sciences (Lynch,
1993) and a large number of studies have been conducted on these sub-
jects.1 However, as in other areas of the social sciences, despite the scale
and scope of the literature on these topics, aside from historical recon-
structions (e.g. Mackenzie, 1981; Stigler, 2002), exploratory studies of
one kind or another (e.g. Livingston, 1987; Gephart, 1988; Bowker and
Star, 1999; Desrosie`res, 2009; Gephart and Smith, 2009; Ruppert, 2007;
McGinn, 2010; Kullenberg, 2011) and schematic ‘as if’2 treatments (e.g.
Latour, 1987; Law, 2009; Sandelowski et al., 2009, Verran, 2012), stat-
istical work, what it consists in and how it is carried off, remains opaque
to the general sociological public. By reading these and other studies we
learn a good deal about what kinds of operations statistical work
involves (e.g. classifying, scaling, calculating, modelling), what those
operations effect (e.g. transformation, formalization, abstraction, simpli-
fication, reduction), how numbers acquire their credibility, their persua-
sive power and their utility (in the course of being harnessed for various
social, political and economic ends) but acquire little sense of how any of
these might be effected in practice (see Gephart and Smith, 2009).
Bowker and Star’s work (1999), for instance, is instructive on the conse-
quences of classification but much less so on the mathematical/statistical
work it rests upon. Even well-regarded textbooks such as Hacking’s
(2001) are largely silent on issues of statistical practice, beginning with
ready-to-work-on, pre-formatted problems rather than inspection of the
in situ work of reasoning those problems, and the worldly troubles which
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accompany them, through. Asked to describe what statisticians do,
we would struggle to respond armed only with the literature cited
above – ‘normal statistics’, to adapt Kuhn, is a foreign land.
While it is beyond the scope of the present article to examine these
issues in depth, we hope to partially redress the balance. Rather than
come at them in the broad, we will concentrate, in the first instance, on
how an operation like mathematization or simplification is accomplished
and the practical work, interpretive and otherwise, that underpins it.
Drawing on ethnomethodological studies of number-involving practices
in a range of ordinary and specialized settings,3 the operations performed
may be quantitative in character but the work involved itself resists treat-
ment in those terms. Although we will be dealing with a form of
expert practice, Bayesian statistics, our interest is in the ‘ethnomethodo-
logical foundations’ or ‘praxiological grounds’ of some of the more
ordinary, and therefore more accessible, features of that work
(Sharrock, 2000). Since we have dealt with more ‘technical’ aspects of
these practices elsewhere (Greiffenhagen et al., forthcoming), we have
chosen to focus here on matters that require little digging to gain an
appreciation of.
We take up two differently leveraged but elementary examples of
‘understanding work’ drawn from a small-scale study – the process of
recasting data into more computationally tractable forms and of calibrat-
ing statistical applications for use by others – precisely because they point
to the more diffuse sets of background competencies upon which these
specialized practices rest. These are aspects of statistical practices which
are passed over in most accounts but, by focusing on them, we gain a
fuller sense of how statisticians orient to and methodically go about their
work as work.4 In the rush to get onto more ‘interesting’ features of
statistical practice it is easy to lose sight of precisely these aspects of it,
and so the ‘tangible fabric’ into which all the different activities which
make up statistical practice are woven (Toulmin, 1953: 10–11; Maynard
and Kardash, 2006: 1485). The examples are thus chosen to correct
simplified conceptions of statistical practice in which the practices have
been largely left out. To adapt Machiavelli, ‘those who [would] make
maps of countries [do well to] place themselves low down in the
plains to study the character of mountains and elevated lands’ (1910
[1532]).
The Praxiological Grounds of Bayesian Statistical Work
In 2010 we conducted fieldwork with a group of Bayesian statisticians in
a UK university who operated across various social science domains as
well as epidemiology and biostatistics. The focus of their work was very
large datasets analysed using complex modelling and computational
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techniques. Funded via a UK-wide, cross-disciplinary research initiative,
they had an explicit remit to experiment with method.
We had a limited amount of time with the group. Although we fol-
lowed the progress they made from afar for around a year all told before
and afterwards (based on publications, reports, conference presentations
and so on), in terms of field visits we could only see them on a handful of
occasions, approximately 12 full days in total in the course of a few
calendar months. As a consequence, we are in no position to discuss
many aspects of their research. However, we can say something about
the kind of work they do. Rather than grapple with the complexities of
contemporary Bayesian modelling here, we concentrate, as discussed
above, on more mundane, less technical aspects of the projects the
group was involved in. While not what they regularly publish on, we
believe an explication of these aspects of statistical practice is revealing,
not least because it exemplifies some of the ways in which statisticians
make ‘social structures’ available in and through their local activities
(Garfinkel, 1967). Not only that, it enables us to be much more specific
about what those local activities are.
Although we say little about the specifically Bayesian aspects of their
work,5 we want to draw attention to some of what makes contemporary
Bayesian statistics distinctive. In the wide and varied literatures on prob-
ability, literatures stretching back centuries (see, e.g., Fienberg, 2006),
Bayesian statistics is normally contrasted with what came to be known
in the 20th century as ‘frequentist’ statistical approaches. The frequentist
approach defines probability in terms of the relative frequency of par-
ticular outcomes of a series of well-defined trials over the (indefinitely)
long run. For Hacking, one of the most influential philosophical advo-
cates of this position, this locates probability firmly in the world:
Statistical inference is chiefly concerned with a physical property,
which may be indicated by the name long run frequency . . . The
long run frequency of an outcome on trials of some kind is a prop-
erty of the chance set-up on which the trials are conducted. (1965:
iii, see also 1–26)
On Hacking’s frequentist interpretation, in studying probabilities – rela-
tive to such things as fair dies, fair coins, or fair roulette wheels, for
example – the statistician is investigating the objective indeed physical
properties of chance set-ups. The Bayesian approach, by contrast, is
typically set out in terms of the degrees of confidence (often cast in
terms of betting odds) we can have in the probability or chance of a
specific outcome of any particular trial. Whereas the frequentist
approach locates probability in the world, as connected to the properties
of objects, the Bayesian approach, first formulated in the 18th century,
thus locates probability, as connected to the beliefs of subjects, in the
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processes by which we draw inferences about it (Efron, 2013). It is for
this reason that Bayesians are often presented as dynamic and informa-
tion-hungry figures, continuously revising their understandings in line
with the latest evidence available to them.
While the frequentist approach dominated 20th-century statistics, the
Bayesian approach has enjoyed incredible growth over the last 30 years
(Fienberg, 2006; Efron, 2013). A field that was a peripheral and derided
fringe interest is, more and more, being treated as a legitimate area of
statistical research and practice, and can be said to have greater appeal in
areas such as epidemiology, biostatistics and high energy physics than its
frequentist ‘rivals’. In order to understand this recent shift in the fortunes
of Bayesian statistics, it is helpful to draw a distinction between two of its
many strands: a distinction between philosophical and methodological
Bayesianism. Philosophical Bayesians are committed to a particular phil-
osophy of statistics with a take on probability and inference quite distinct
from that of frequentists. Methodological Bayesians, on the other hand,
are committed to using the methodological approaches – forms of model
building and so on – that have been developed within the Bayesian
framework to address particular kinds of statistical problems. A statis-
tician can be a methodological Bayesian without being a philosophical
Bayesian, and, indeed, those we worked with in our study were of that
cast of mind. They felt the ‘tools’ of Bayesian statistics were useful for
answering the kinds of statistical problem they were most interested in
and had a pragmatic, instrumental orientation to their work, showing
little interest in discussions about the ‘ultimate’ nature of probability and
inference – discussions we tried and failed to engage them in. Bayesian
approaches are spreading, not because philosophical Bayesianism has
triumphed over philosophical frequentism (as in all areas of metatheore-
tical and indeed metaphysical debate, a source of endless, unresolvable
dispute), but for reasons more associated with methodological
Bayesianism: computing power has improved so much that it is now
possible to undertake the calculations needed to do Bayesian modelling.
The key breakthrough has not been a metaphysical but a practical one
– the rise of, in particular, Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) meth-
ods, the availability of open-source Bayesian statistical analysis pack-
ages, such as the ‘BUGS’ (Bayesian inference Using Gibbs Sampling)
project, and powerful enough computers to process MCMC computa-
tions in those packages to determine the distributions from which their
models proceed (Diaconis, 2009; Efron, 2013). Bayesian statistics is much
more prominent today, in other words, because it has become a viable
way of doing statistics, whereas in the past it was not.6 Furthermore,
Bayesian statistics is not as radical a departure from frequentism as it can
sometimes appear to be. Bayes’ theorem, the engine of Bayesian infer-
ence, can be unproblematically derived from the probability axioms
accepted by statisticians of all hues and in many other respects too
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converges with frequentist statistical approaches (Gelman and Shalizi,
2013: 26). As a result,
we may see contemporary statistics as a place of happy eclecticism:
the wealth of computational ability allows for the application of
countless methods with little hand-wringing about foundations.
Contemporary practitioners may work blissfully free of the old
frequentist-Bayesian controversies; younger statisticians . . . seem
only distantly aware of them. (Mayo, 2011: 79)
Debates about mathematical foundations, any more than debates about
philosophical foundations, are not where the relevant differences could
or do lie. The most important work-relevant distinctions between a
Bayesian and a non-Bayesian are instead to do with such things as the
modelling techniques they are most familiar with, the problem-solving
strategies they have been trained in, the computer programmes they turn
to in order to do the work of modelling, calculation and computation,
and the literatures and practical examples they regard as useful guides in
their own work. Within this, what is unusual about many areas of con-
temporary Bayesian statistics, as opposed to frequentist ones, is that they
employ different kinds of data and modelling techniques for handling
them. This heterogeneity of material, methodology and modelling tech-
niques is the result of an emphasis on making use of as many different
types of evidence as possible when making probabilistic calculations, no
matter what form the data initially may take (i.e. whether it comes pre-
quantified or not; Lynch et al., 2008: 187–9).
For instance, Bayesians, unlike other statisticians, engage in
limited forms of data collection, including, among other things,7 conduct-
ing interviews with experts in particular fields in order to work out initial
probability distributions (priors) to ‘plug’ into their models. As with other
uses of data, this process is explicitly formalized, conforming to set rules
which govern how to conduct these ‘elicitations’ and appropriately quan-
tify the results. Nonetheless, although Bayesians do formalize many
aspects of the research process, much of what they routinely do is not
explicitly set out in formal terms.
One member of the group, when asked about the nature of the work,
explained, in an off-hand remark,8 that it consisted of 5 per cent elation,
5 per cent despair and 90 per cent tedium. Although those we worked
with occasionally drew attention to that 90 per cent, and all were aware
that it was central to the job, it was rarely given extended treatment in
their publications despite making up the bulk of what they did, some-
thing replicated across the field – making it the ‘dark matter’ of statistical
practice (see Chatfield, 2002). We found, as a result, that published work
was a particularly poor guide for those not already initiated in what
doing statistics involves, furnishing us with little by way of practical
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instruction on how to make sense of the work we witnessed these
researchers engaging in. Statisticians do not talk about routine practice
in an extended way in their publications, and for good reason: it is not
what interests their colleagues and collaborators and so is not reportable
as research. Instead, it constitutes a ‘specifically uninteresting’ adjunct to
it (Garfinkel, 1967; Davis, 1971). Despite this, in the course of our study
of the work of this particular group, we were able to gain insights into
some of these less discussed aspects of statistical practice.9
One of the first things to note is that statisticians are rarely directly
involved in the process of gathering the data they seek to analyse – stat-
isticians’ offices are largely free from the accompanying clutter of survey
research: tape recorders, piles of completed questionnaires or interview
transcripts, and so on. Instead, their work normally begins after the
primary data has been collected.10 Statistical work is, as a result,
deeply collaborative, resting on a division of labour between those who
produce, manage and can provide access to datasets (who we will refer to
as ‘domain experts’ following those we studied) and those with sufficient
statistical skill to exploit their affordances. The statistician’s role, within
these collaborations, is to provide well formed, ‘ready-made’ tools, i.e.
models but not solely models, for answering domain experts’ questions.
These are questions the domain experts would not have been able to
answer in those ways were they to rely solely on their own statistical
expertise but which the statisticians, equally, could not answer without
access to the data. Neither can proceed without the other: statistician and
domain expert form a ‘symbiotic’ relationship (Kish, 1978: 1). The first
aspect of statistical practice we discuss relates to the work undertaken in
the initial stages of this collaborative process.
Interpreting Quantitative Data
When members of the group first acquired access to the databases that
they were to use as testing-grounds for developing and trialling their
methodological tools, they came at them ‘cold’. That is, they had to
gain familiarity with the idiosyncrasies of the given database through a
range of often highly skilled craft techniques acquired and developed
through extensive experience that are often glossed under the heading
of ‘the initial examination of data’ (Chatfield, 2002). No database is
perfect, but it was the specific character of the imperfections of whatever
database the researchers were working on that absorbed their time and
attention in a project’s initial phases. Gaining familiarity with a database
by slowly working on it so as to make it manipulable in the requisite ways
included exploratory ‘probing’, ‘cleaning’, ‘recoding’, ‘programming’ and
‘testing’, operations often (misleadingly) seen as low-level, mechanical
and intellectually undemanding.11 What such characterizations miss is
that this initial preparatory work is actually among the most important
60 Theory, Culture & Society 33(3)
 at Loughborough University on April 15, 2016tcs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
the researchers perform. These ‘elementary’ operations are necessary
preliminaries to more complex ones, and they provide the researchers
with the opportunity to see not only how their data is organized but
also to reflect on what the data is ‘about’. This is not just about grasping
the formal properties of matrices of numbers but about grasping why
certain items have come to be included as part of those matrices and to
what ends – only in this way can the ground be laid for the work of
modelling.
By painstakingly undertaking these exploratory analyses and prepara-
tory work –workwhich, in the case we examined, proceeded hand-in-hand
with, and was mutually informed by, the creation of bespoke, customized
code in specialized statistical software programmes that was purpose-writ-
ten for the task of analysing the dataset at hand – statisticians are able to
take ‘alien’ datasets produced by others and make them their ‘own’,
moulding them in line with their own slowly developing sense of the cal-
culative possibilities they present. In the course of learning how the dataset
has been set up, what it includes and how it is structured, they thus become
manipulable ‘contextures’, numerical fields within which model building
can temporally unfold as a series of demonstrably and accountably rea-
soned operations, available for others to see and inspect (Lynch, 1991b).
In the initial phases, coming to know and understand the dataset,
exploring its structural potentials and opening it up for statistical
manipulation involved finding out, among other things, what items in
the database were designed to index and so gain a feel for them as mater-
ials relevant to the work. Approached with this intent, datasets were not
just grids of numbers with discoverable mathematical and probabilistic
relations (see Figure 1) but socio-cultural artefacts with discernible char-
acters and peculiarities all of their own. Many features of the datasets
which were immediately intelligible to those who produced them were
not available to the statistician working on them at one remove, and
making them intelligible meant grasping ordinary aspects of the socio-
cultural context(s) in which they were produced. As a consequence, the
researchers had to engage in investigative work, making specific, limited
inquiries into the use of particular measures so as to find out information
about the society and culture from which those particular measures had
been taken and thereby determine why particular measures had been
included and what the dataset could therefore be said to capture.
One of the main methodological problems these researchers were
investigating was how to amplify the inferential potential of longitudinal
studies, and they were trying to do this by creating a generic method-
ology for linking differently organized longitudinal datasets together
around measures common to them all (principally measures of age, eth-
nicity, socio-economic status, levels of education, etc.). They had access
to an international dataset containing a large number of longitudinal
studies, and those they ended up working with covered 12 countries
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and included data on around 70,000 participants. Educational attain-
ment, one of the variables they were most interested in, had been
coded in a range of different ways: sometimes as a continuous variable,
i.e. number of years of education completed, sometimes using country-
specific standards, i.e. ‘junior high school’ versus ‘key-stage five’, to take
US and UK examples respectively. Drawing on this jumble of data, the
aim was to reclassify participants across the various studies as possessing
a low, medium or high level of education by creating a more orderly and
well-behaved variable, something which would enable associations with
other variables to be modelled as part of the testing of the generic meth-
odology they wanted to develop (see Figure 2).
The difficulty was that the researchers had no immediate way of know-
ing what anyone within the societies covered by the studies would know
by virtue of their (often historical) membership within them: namely,
what does ‘has completed ten years of education’ amount to in
Finland, for example, and does it mean the same thing as it does in
France? The measures were indexical – their meaning depended on the
Figure 1. The database as a numerical grid.
Source: Wikipedia. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share
Alike 3.0 Unported license.
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cultural context in which they were used – and, as a result, the researchers
had to find ways of translating the variously coded educational data into
a common format. They did so on the basis of discussions with ‘natives’
and by consulting historical sources that described their practices (some
of those in the studies had been born in the early decades of the 20th
century and educational systems in their countries had changed consid-
erably in the period since). These investigations into (restricted features
of) the culturally indexed properties of the category ‘years of education
completed’ thus established general grounds for treating individuals as
possessing a low, medium or high level of education relative to others at
particular moments in those societies’ histories.
This interpretive, ‘anthropological’ inquiry into cultural categories
hinged entirely on exploring the conventional meaning of those cate-
gories and the results of that inquiry were themselves understood and
used by the statisticians in those conventional terms (see also Desrosie`res,
2009). That is, they were not interested in whether, in any actual case,
someone had been fairly categorized as possessing above or below aver-
age levels of education but how in general such characterizations were
used independently of their accuracy in any given case. The derived vari-
able was thus in no way meant as a putative description of actual cases
but functioned as an ethnographic translation of culturally specific and
culturally recognized ways of talking about such matters in the broad.
This form of investigative activity may be dismissed as trivial, at first
glance, perhaps because of its circumscribed and limited character, per-
haps due to its sheer intuitive obviousness. Moreover, it isn’t especially
‘interesting’, not even to those involved. It is not what people want to
talk about, statisticians included, when they talk about what they do.
This would be, however, to under-estimate our elementary case. In recent
work, Kullenberg (2011) describes a Swedish statistical institute’s
attempts to encourage participation in its surveys and the strategies
used to get participants to cooperate. Kullenberg talks of those statisti-
cians’ reliance on a ‘knowledge of practice’ which is ‘manifested in
action’ as a form of ‘legwork sociology’ all about getting the job of
survey research done, something which presupposes ways of ‘knowing
Education CLS 
(Australia) 
HOPE 
(Scotland) 
LASA 
(Netherland) 
OCTO 
(Sweden) 
SATSA 
(Sweden) 
Low 1–9 yrs 1–9 yrs 1–9 yrs 1–7 yrs Level 1 
Medium 10–12 yrs 10–12 yrs 10–12 yrs 8–12 yrs Level 2-3 
High >=13 yrs >=13 yrs >=13 yrs >=13 yrs Level 4 
Figure 2. Making heterogeneous data more tractable, classifying education.
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about society’ that are not themselves quantified or even perhaps quan-
tifiable, being more akin to recipes (2011: 74–5, see also Schutz, 1944).
Developing Kullenberg’s analysis, our case provides an encapsulated,
site-specific and locally leveraged tutorial in what it means to talk of
the interpretive grounds of ordinary quantitative work (Kuhn, 1977;
Gephart, 1988), a ‘Geertzian’ exercise in explicating and communicating
meaning with research materials through an exploration of the use of
conventional cultural categories. It shows how interpretation unproblem-
atically goes hand-in-hand with quantification and so reveals the inter-
dependence of both. That is not to elevate the work involved but rather
to draw attention to the ordinary forms of practical sociological reason-
ing that provide the ‘grounds’ for anthropological and sociological
inquiry too (Schutz, 1944; Garfinkel, 1967; Moerman, 1969; Garfinkel
and Sacks, 1970; Geertz, 1973; Sacks, 1992).
However, despite highlighting qualitative dimensions of quantitative
work, we would also do well not to go too far the other way and cede
analytical priority to interpretation. If we fixated on interpretation we
would lose sight of the interesting question of what goes without saying,
what requires no interpretation at all. For one thing, note that the inves-
tigation of equivalences across dissimilar datasets presupposed that
equivalences were there to be drawn. That is, this particular analysis
assumed that the societies and cultures across which the data was col-
lected were organized in sufficiently similar ways to make the search for
equivalences meaningful. They looked, in other words, because they
knew there was something to be looked for. No investigation was neces-
sary to establish that, for example, the education level of children, again
as conventionally understood, does not decrease as they make their way
through school. Note too that no equivalent concerns were raised about
the use of numbers across these societies and cultures. The fact that 10
could be taken to mean the same thing from one place to another for
their practical investigative purposes was not something that needed to be
questioned in these particular circumstances. As Wittgenstein reminds us
with respect to number symbols on railway time-tables: ‘What happens is
not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no
interpreting . . .As I have a railway time-table and use it without being
concerned with the fact that a table can be interpreted in various ways’
(1974: Part I, §99). In our example, it is not that the number systems in
play could not have been interrogated in all manner of heterodox ways –
the statisticians involved were certainly capable of such interrogation –
but that the nature of the activity in which they were engaged did not call
for it, something they knew without having to ask.
However, they were not merely or blindly presupposing such things: in
taking those surroundings for granted, in treating them as grounds for
further inference and action themselves in no need of independent justi-
fication, they were also putting them to work for their own specific
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investigative purposes. In these and endlessly many other ways, statisti-
cians rely on ‘commonsense knowledge of social structures’ (Garfinkel,
1967) in order to put those structures, here educational structures, on
display and thereby make them observable-reportable. It is the specifics
of such uses that are of interest. It is precisely because interpretation has
its limits, that it is not boundless but bounded, that such analyses become
intelligible – and recognizable – as accounts of social and cultural affairs
at all.
Statistical work does not, then, involve the evacuation of meaning – an
accusation commonly levelled at quantitative research – but efforts to
capture meaning. In our case, the statisticians themselves were involved
in the interpretive task of unravelling the interweaving of cultural and
technical reasoning in the production of the artifacts they were working
with. Moreover, the results of that inquiry were themselves understood
and put to work by the statisticians in those very terms, with the same
taken-for-granted assumptions employed in producing the data also used
in the analysis. Putting society on display, then, is not merely a matter of
calculation but of artfully exhibiting membership in social worlds inhab-
ited and known in common (Schutz, 1944), something Sacks identified as
central to ‘cultures’, as sets of procedures for producing recognizable
actions, more broadly (Sacks, 1992: 227). It is precisely because, in
being made use of, they are assumed – indeed, it is in their being assumed
– that such things as ‘levels of education’ stand as features of a world in
which it is possible, under at least some circumstances, to investigate
regularities across societies despite cultural variation. The specific
forms of social and cultural inquiry that we have drawn attention to in
this section, forms of ‘ethnographic’ investigation that provide the back-
drop to and which directly inform and shape the ‘technical’ work, are
thus integral to the success of the statistical enterprise as it is in and
through them that their analyses can be seen to unproblematically con-
nect up with, and be seen to be speaking of and to, the everyday social
and cultural worlds from which their materials derive.
Statistical Publics and Theatres of Proof
Our second example deals with another kind of ‘verstehen’ work that
forms part of the statisticians’ craft but again is rarely explicitly
remarked upon. Despite having their own areas of substantive expertise,
members of the statistical unit whose work we studied found their status
as methodologists was foregrounded in the course of their collaborations
with other investigators (particularly collaborations with those outside
their ‘home’ fields, as was the case in most of the projects we had oppor-
tunity to follow). As noted, statistical research typically involves the
interplay of primary research and statistical analysis, and this is usually
the responsibility of different personnel with specialized skills.
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Beyond the level of co-production examined in the discussion above,
another level of interplay is involved.12
In order to create statistical tools that are useful, usable and will get
used, statisticians have to find ways of aligning others’ analytical interests
with their own. They need to see problems encountered in practice from
their collaborators’ perspectives, as this is part of devising solutions that
anticipate and speak to the collaborators’ problems while producing
work that is statistically innovative. However, this means that to tell
methodological stories, statisticians have to be in a position to tell sub-
stantive stories. They have to show that they can account for real-world
phenomena in terms of any given method (or model) and so show others
what the tools they have produced can do for them. This involves
developing applications of instrumental value to non-statisticians who
may not be in any position to ‘appreciate’ the novelty or sophistication
of the statistical work itself. This is a far from straightforward task, and
involves significant ‘understanding work’ in its own right.
As Winch puts it, the relation of social scientists ‘to the performers
of . . . [an] activity cannot be just that of observer to observed. It must
rather be analogous to the participation of the natural scientist with his
fellow-workers in the activities of scientific investigation’ (1958: 87–8).
And the problem of understanding ‘fellow-workers’ can be particularly
acute, involving them in ‘doing, recognizing and using ethnographies’
(Garfinkel, 1967: 10) in related though nonetheless distinct ways to that
discussed in the previous section. Alongside their ethnographic forays
into the social, cultural and technical production of statistical data,
statisticians also have to develop an understanding of those who
would use the outcomes of their work in order to understand the sets
of relevancies, often quite different to their own, within which their
work might find a place or fit. This requirement means they must pro-
duce solutions that not only handle defined statistical problems but do
so in demonstrably relevant ways, enabling others, as in the case of the
unit we studied, to make sense of the three-dimensional growth of
cancer cells in the human body, of spatio-temporal differentiation in
income patterns or in voting by social and ethnic group across small
areas. Models had to interest, to capture the attention: they had to offer
a ready answer to the question, ‘what will this do for me?’. Developing
applications that others could see the demonstrable relevance of was far
more of an art, a matter of trial and error, than a science. Technical
sophistication or novelty on its own was not enough. The capacity to
pinpoint arresting applications among a large range of potential appli-
cations (which would be reviewed and discussed at the start of a project
in conjunction with the databases to which the statisticians had access
to or had worked on before) was acquired through hard work and
often difficult first-hand experiences of failure, as we shall see in the
example that follows.
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The project from which that second example is taken was an attempt
to offer new ways of modelling bias due to survey non-response. The
problem at its core was how to develop a systematic approach to analys-
ing the problem of missing data. Missing data is regarded as a species of
selection bias which arises due to partial or total non-response in large-
scale surveys: i.e. respondents either skipping particular questions or not
responding to the survey at all. The stock solution has long been list-wise
deletion, simply erasing the entry, i.e. the record of those persons who
have failed to answer, containing wholly or partly missing information.
This is unsatisfactory for various well-recognized statistical reasons. Are
the people who do not answer of a kind? Does their erasure mean infer-
ences drawn from what remains will be distorted in unknown but poten-
tially serious ways? The answer to both questions is thought to be yes,
but the standard approach leaves this impossible to determine, with sus-
picions of bias haunting the conclusions made. The approach taken on
this particular project was to develop a different kind of solution to the
problem. That solution turned on treating non-response itself as a vari-
able and building hierarchical models that drew on multiple over-layered
data-sources to ‘fill in’ or ‘impute’ missing variables, using complex
random simulations to build synthetic entries for those who would other-
wise have been consigned to the statistical void. The overall goal was to
communicate a series of methodological messages, primarily:
. missing data matters;
. doing nothing is doing something (i.e. it has effects on the inferences drawn);
. there are a variety of ways of dealing with the problem, not simply list-wise
deletion;
. Bayesian modelling compares very favourably with the most effective of the
alternatives available.
Nonetheless, despite the methodological if not reflexive aspect of the
project (a statistical researcher studying the practices of statistical
research statistically), the study had to remain anchored to substantive
questions. In order to make the methodological point (and hence make
the case for the Bayesian solution to the problem of missing data), the
researchers involved crafted demonstrations that examined the effects of
non-response on analyses of exposure to certain chemicals and birth-
weight as well as the relationships between ethnicity, education, marital
status and income. It was these demonstration cases that enabled the
researchers to take the research ‘public’ (Gieryn, 2002), and stage their
own ‘theatres of proof’ designed to persuade quantitative domain experts
of the relevance of their work (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985).
At the time of our research, this particular study had been underway
for around a year and a half. It was the most methodologically focused of
all the projects we studied and involved a great deal of what other stat-
isticians, let alone domain experts, regarded as particularly high-level and
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esoteric modelling. In the phase we witnessed, the focus was switching
from modelling over to demonstrating the practical gains of that model-
ling work. We were able to attend a series of preparatory meetings in the
run-up to one of the first public presentations of results from the
research, a workshop held by the principal external collaborator
the team were working with as part of this project as well as, finally,
the reporting-back/debriefing session which followed it.
A major aspect of the build-up to the presentation of this work was the
selection of graphs and plots that were thought to best express the power
of the solution the researcher was proposing. Statistics are often pre-
sented as ‘speaking for themselves’. However, such ‘speaking’ is of
course carefully designed, i.e. requires work (cf. Tufte, 2006). This is
exactly what we observed in this and other project meetings. In an aver-
age meeting, 50-plus ‘plots’ would be discussed. These discussions did not
hinge on the ‘correctness’ of the graphic displays (which was assumed)
but on their usefulness for making the character of the work they were to
exhibit perspicuous in certain ways, where the question of what could be
seen in any given display was itself clarified in the course of comparing
and contrasting the merits of a range of candidate displays. The purpose
of presenting these displays was a central consideration in this: it was not
that, in isolation, these were ‘good’ or ‘better’ than other graphs and
plots but that these were ‘good’ or ‘better’ relative to the occasion, audi-
ence and message the researchers were trying to convey. If no viable
candidates could be found for those particular purposes, the researchers
would go back to the statistical drawing board. Graphic displays of
statistical findings were, then, being continually developed and revised
with an eye to how they would be or had been responded to. Potential
users therefore appeared as ‘scenic features’ of the development process
over its course (Sharrock and Anderson, 1994).
Following a run-through with members of the unit which threw up no
particular problems, the workshop where the work was presented ‘for
real’ did not go particularly well. The researcher received limited feed-
back from the audience and a less than enthusiastic response from the
external collaborator. It was not that the fundamentals of the modelling
had been challenged. Worse, they had not really come up for discussion
at all. The research had not spoken to those at the workshop (it did not
‘speak their language’; Bowman, 2007). As a consequence, the researcher
voiced a keen sense of what we might call ‘professional disappointment’.
The audience had been unwilling to engage with what made the research
innovative in methodological terms because they were unable to identify
any particularly visible substantive reward in doing so – they could not
see what was in it for them. As a result, the discussion focused on what
the researcher saw as the least statistically interesting or significant parts
of what they were attempting to do. The response, perhaps
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unsurprisingly, was read as a sign of indifference to the central methodo-
logical messages.
The debriefing raised interesting questions related to the entanglement
of methodology, application and audience in statistical research. In the
course of their discussion, the unit’s director assured the researcher
whose work this was that it was a common experience, highlighting the
need to see misunderstandings as themselves an issue for interpretation in
the process. As the director put it:
That sounds like experiences I’ve had. There’s some discussion of
the application but no interest in the methodology . . . It’s quite
hard, and this comes back to what we’ve said before, to respond
to the ‘so what’ [question]. Because you don’t demonstrate huge
impacts of dealing with missing data [in the presentation], people
say ‘well, at the end of the day there’s an awful lot of complex
modelling involved and what’s the gain?’. I know you’ve tried to
think about that and say you’ve got to understand the assumptions
you’re making, but it’s difficult.
Without a persuasive substantive story to tell, the methodological point
was not taken up and recognition of this meant substantially reworking
the analysis (over a period of some months) in order to make it seeably
relevant to others. This involved anticipating better the tasks those who
might use the techniques would want them to do and finding a new
application which made its utility more immediately apparent. This pro-
vides another sense in which understanding work is crucial to the enter-
prise of quantification. Not only do statisticians have to think carefully
about the perspective from which others gauge their work but, as this
case also shows, ultimately the models have to do the talking in research
of this kind: they have to demonstrably deliver. Where models do deliver,
the understanding work embedded in the model is successful precisely
where there is no need for it to be made explicit. Failure is most apparent
where the import of what has been done, like a joke that has fallen flat,
has to be explained at length to those it was directed to.
Once again, we see that statisticians must possess a grasp of social and
cultural worlds, this time the worlds of those who would use the out-
comes of their work, a set of competencies that are acquired as part of
doing statistical work. Once again, and with a slight shift of emphasis, we
see a set of methods for exhibiting commonsense knowledge of social
structure in the making of ‘successful research’ – knowledge which is
ubiquitous, pervasive and relied upon without explicit formulation or
discussion. Indeed, ‘old hands’ writing on this very subject have denied
such knowledge of the ‘context of justification’ could be formalized,
treating it instead as a craft form central to the practice, one which resists
formalization and is only capable of being acquired through engaging in
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that practice (Chatfield, 2002). In sum, orienting to others in the produc-
tion of statistical ‘accounts’ points to another less visible ‘Winchean’ way
in which understandings of ‘social structure’ are also put on display in
the statistician’s work, as well as the different kinds of social and cultural
investigation it is developed through.
Conclusion
We have presented two examples of the ways in which ‘the social struc-
tures of everyday activities’ are exhibited in and through statistical work:
via, firstly, displayed understandings of the social and cultural contexts –
the everyday social and cultural worlds that statisticians are also mem-
bers of – within which databases as numerical artifacts are produced;
and, secondly, displayed understandings of the users of, and uses to
which, statistical models may be put. The capacity to do either well
was tied to a diffuse set of competencies involving what we have
termed ‘understanding work’, lines of social and cultural inquiry under-
taken as part of and not simply in parallel with model and application
building, with one informing the other. We would suggest that the spe-
cificities of this work – what made it the work it was – are to be located
here, not in whether it was more or less qualitative or quantitative, more
or less interpretive or calculative. Those labels, while useful under some
conditions, have little value as guides to what these and, we would ven-
ture, other researchers routinely get up to. If we are to develop studies of
the ‘social life of methods’ as part of a more empirically-oriented and
descriptive ‘sociology of social scientific knowledge’ (Maynard and
Schaeffer, 2000; Savage, 2009, 2013), we would suggest that we cannot
proceed by taking ready-made distinctions, such as that between quali-
tative and quantitative research, for granted, even for critical purposes,
as the starting point for our inquiries. Instead, following Garfinkel, we
suggest that a more profitable way of proceeding is to treat such distinc-
tions as problematic from the off and attempt to ascertain what, if any,
relevance they have at the level of practice, something those interested in
the social life of method have had little concretely to say about as yet.
Investigating the praxiological grounds of ‘methods work’ is not neces-
sarily a straightforward matter. The ‘low-level’ (we might say ‘founda-
tional’) aspects of such things as ‘making a database your own’ and
‘developing analyses demonstrably relevant to others’ will be pervasive
features of statistical research more broadly, Bayesian or not. However,
the commonplace character of that work means it will also go (at least in
large part) ‘seen-but-unnoticed’, liable to be overlooked by those coming
at researchers’ work through the accounts given in their publications.
This is not a mark of the researchers’ duplicity or negligence – it shows
that such practices, while central to what researchers do, are not con-
stituent of the relevant disciplinarily reportable parts of their work.
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Instead, they are firmly within that domain of ‘knowledge’ that, for
example, every competent statistician knows without having to be told
and which there is much more to than can be said ‘in so many words’
(Garfinkel, 1967).
The examples we drew from our case study also show that there is
much more to ‘method’ than is typically allowed. Perhaps such practices
have been overlooked to date because they simply have not seemed
‘interesting’ enough to be explored in any great depth (Davis, 1971).
Precisely because they are treated as ‘banal’ – the chores of statistical
work – by statisticians themselves, it is easy to miss the different ways in
which statistical work, for instance, presents and proceeds on the basis of
an accomplished understanding of social practice. Such understandings
are seamlessly stitched into and exhibited by quantitative practices – they
generate no friction, they are not ‘out of place’ but are entirely ‘in place’
within them. Statisticians do not worry about this aspect of their work,
by and large, but can get on with the job in the knowledge that compe-
tence in them can be taken on trust – until, that is, things go wrong, as in
our second example. The ways in which statistics put society on display
are thus quite deeply embedded in statistical practice – it is for that very
reason that investigations of them open up unexplored methodological
worlds.
Our elementary examples are thus important in the first instance, we
would argue, because they allow us to gain an appreciation of the spe-
cificities of statistical work as work. They also, however and as a result,
allow us to see the limits of current work on the social life of methods,
particularly Law, Ruppert and Savage’s analysis of their ‘doubly social’
character. On the basis of what was only a small study, a prolegomenon
of sorts to a more extended and in-depth body of research on these issues,
we have been able to start to point to the heterogeneous collection of
activities upon which statistical method rests, just two aspects of which
we have discussed here. Methods are social; they are both in and of
societies, as Law, Ruppert and Savage suggest, but not in the same
way. Law, Ruppert and Savage establish a problematic, but it is one
the pursuit of which leads rather quickly to its own dissolution because
we soon find, when we go in search of method, that no such overarching
thing exists in any simple sense. For that reason, recognizing that statis-
tical research, like other forms of social scientific work, is social through-
and-through can only be a starting point, a heuristic – it does not itself
constitute an account of the practices in question.
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Notes
1. We cannot do justice to the volume and variety of these studies but a brief
survey, starting in the 20th century, would include reference to Husserl
(1936), Hacking (1965, 1975, 1990; but see also 2001, 2002), Foucault (e.g.
1975), MacKenzie (1981), Livingston (1986), Porter (1986, 1996), Latour
(1987), Gephart (1988; Gephart and Smith, 2009), Lynch (e.g. 1991a;
1991b; 1993), Potter, Wetherell and Chitty (1991), Desrosie`res (e.g. 1998),
Bowker and Star (1999) and, more recently, to the likes of Stigler (2002),
Kirby (2005), Ruppert (e.g. 2007), Espeland and Stevens (2008), Law (2009),
Saetnan, Lomell and Hammer (2011) and Courgeau (2012), among others.
2. The hallmark of ‘as if’ (or ‘might as well’) accounts in this area is the recon-
struction (or ‘redescription’) of statistical or mathematical practice on the
basis of the products of that practice rather than a study of the practice
itself. John Law’s ‘Seeing Like a Survey’ (2009) is an archetype of a ‘recov-
ered’, ‘imagined’ or ‘projected’ description, i.e. one which proceeds ‘as if’
things had been (or ‘might as well have been’) done in ways the analyst
regards as plausible (see Sacks, 1963).
3. For example Sacks (1992); Cicourel (1964); Livingston (1986, 1987); Gephart
(1988); Goodwin (1994); Greiffenhagen and Sharrock (2006); Lynch et al.
(2008); Martin and Lynch (2009); Gephart and Smith (2009).
4. Features of their practices which, crucially, statisticians themselves use to help
others orient to their work as work – in our case, these examples are what we
were pointed to so that we could gain a better appreciation of what the
statisticians whose work we were following were actually doing.
5. But for an introduction see Hacking (2001), and for applications see Lynch
et al. (2008).
6. And was both data and computationally intensive long before it became
fashionable.
7. See Lynch et al. (2008: 190–219) for a particularly interesting example of a
Bayesian approach to the quantification of ‘commonsense knowledge’.
8. We would echo Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) insistence that ‘off-hand’, ‘light-
hearted’ or ‘joking’ comments often say a great deal about the ‘serious’ work
they comment on.
9. Note, however, that while they did not talk about it, that does not mean they
did not see, recognize, understand, appreciate, think about, reflect upon or
otherwise take time to reason such matters through. Failures to do so were
accountable, i.e. they were picked up and were both visible-reportable and
correctable so that consideration of them could be eliminated from publica-
tion – because, again, they were ‘not interesting’ rather than because they
needed to be concealed. It was not, then, that they had no conception of such
things, they just did not discuss it publicly or reflectively topicalize the pres-
ence of these matters in their work. Not all absences constitute failures. There
is not enough time in the world to say everything, and were anyone to try, no-
one would stick around to listen – ethnomethodologists partially excepted.
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10. Including expert elicitation, which Bayesians undertake as part of modelling
already gathered data.
11. Chatfield (2002) is very good on this point, underscoring the overlooked
importance of the pragmatic side of statistical work to the stability of the
enterprise as a whole.
12. See Desrosie`res (1997, 2001, 2009) for discussions of closely related sets of
issues, discussions we have drawn on throughout this section but develop in
a different way.
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